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Abstract
Auctions are the most widely used strategic game-theoretic mechanisms in the Internet. Auctions
have been mostly studied from a game-theoretic and economic perspective, although recent work in
AI and OR has been concerned with computational aspects of auctions as well. When faced from a
computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging type of auctions.
Combinatorial auctions are auctions where agents may submit bids for bundles of goods. Given
that finding an optimal allocation of the goods in a combinatorial auction is in general intractable,
researchers have been concerned with exposing tractable instances of combinatorial auctions. In this
work we expose the use of b-matching techniques in the context of combinatorial auctions, and apply
them in a non-trivial manner in order to introduce polynomial solutions for a variety of combinatorial
auctions.
 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The emergence of electronic commerce has led to increasing interest in the design of
protocols for non-cooperative environments (see, e.g., [4,6,12,16]). The wide-spread of
auctions in the Internet, and the fact that auctions are basic building blocks for a variety
of economic protocols have attracted many researchers to tackle the challenge of efficient
auction design (e.g., [7,8,10,14,17]). The design of auctions introduces deep problems and
challenges both from the game-theoretic and from the computational perspectives. This
paper mainly concentrates on computational aspects of auctions. More specifically, we
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concentrate on addressing computational problems of combinatorial auctions, extending
upon previous work on this basic topic [5,9,13,15].
In an auction, a seller sells several goods to several potential buyers. In typical single-
object auctions, determining the auction’s winner and its payment is computationally triv-
ial. The problem is still computationally tractable when agents’ valuations for the different
objects are additive, i.e., determined in an additive manner by their valuations for the sin-
gle goods. However, consider a situation where a VCR, a TV, and a Microwave are sold;
an agent may be willing to pay $200 for the TV, $300 for the VCR, and $150 for the mi-
crowave, but might be willing to pay only $550 for getting all of them. In order to allocate
the goods in a satisfactory manner, bids for bundles of goods should be allowed; given these
bids, we need to find an optimal, revenue maximizing, allocation of the goods. This prob-
lem is referred to as the combinatorial auction problem, and it is in general intractable [13].
One can partition previous work on computational aspects of combinatorial auctions
into two parts. One part deals with heuristics for the solution of combinatorial auctions
(see, e.g., [5,15]), while the other part deals with the identification of tractable cases of
the combinatorial auctions problem (see [9,13]). Our work fits into the latter category.
Previous results in that category has introduced a general technique for tackling the
complexity of combinatorial auctions. Namely, several authors [3,9] have dealt with the
problem of winner determination in combinatorial auctions as an integer programming
[IP] problem, and considered linear programming [LP] relaxations of that problem for
isolating tractable cases of the general problem. This paper equips researchers who deal
with the theory and practice of combinatorial auctions with an additional general technique
for addressing the complexity of that problem. Namely, we expose and explore the use
of b-matching techniques for the combinatorial auctions setup, and employ b-matching
techniques in various ways in order to efficiently address several non-trivial instances of
the combinatorial auctions problem. The use of b-matching techniques in the solution
of other auctions is discussed in [11]. The b-matching techniques introduced there are
however not applicable to combinatorial auctions as discussed in this paper; to the best of
our knowledge this is the first paper to consider and apply b-matching techniques to the
context of combinatorial auctions.
In Section 2 we present some preliminaries. In particular, we describe the basic b-
matching problem, and the combinatorial auctions problem. In Sections 3–7 we expose
the use of b-matching techniques for the solution of combinatorial auctions and present
polynomial solutions for a variety of combinatorial auctions.
2. Preliminaries
Let G = (V (G),E(G)) be a graph, where V (G) is a set of nodes, and E(G) is
a set of edges. Each edge e ∈ E(G) is assigned a (real number) cost we. Let b =
((l1, b1), (l2, b2), . . . , (l|V |, b|V |)), where the bi ’s are integers and li equals bi or 0 (1 
i  |V (G)|). A b-matching is a set M ⊆ E(G) such that, for each node i ∈ V (G), the
number of edges incident with i is no more than bi and no less than li . The value of a
b-matching is the sum of costs of its edges, i.e.,
∑{we | e ∈M}. The b-matching problem
is to find a b-matching of maximum value.
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An important result of the field of combinatorial optimization is that the b-matching
problem is polynomial [1,2]. This result widely extends upon the more commonly known
results about the computation of (standard) matchings, and will play a significant role in
this paper.
In a combinatorial auctions setup a seller sells m goods to n potential buyers. A bid of
agent i is a pair (S,p), where S is a bundle of goods and p is a non-negative real number
that denotes the price offer for S. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xt }, where xi = (si ,pi), 1 i  t ,
be a set of bids, and denote by S(xi) and P(xi) the bundle of goods and the price offer
of bid xi , respectively. The combinatorial auction problem [CAP] is to find an Xo ⊆ X,
for which
∑
Xo
P (xi) is maximal, under the constraint that S(xi) ∩ S(xj ) = ∅ for every
xi, xj ∈Xo, i 	= j . The CAP is NP-hard [13].
The literature distinguishes between two types of combinatorial auctions. In a sub-
additive combinatorial auction an agent’s bid for every bundle S = S1 ∪ S2, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅
of goods, is less than or equal to the sum of its bids for S1 and S2. In a super-additive
combinatorial auction an agent’s bid for every bundle S = S1 ∪ S2, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ of goods,
is greater than or equals to the sum of its bids for S1 and S2. Auctions for substitute goods
are sub-additive, while auctions for complementary goods are super-additive.
3. Quantity restrictions in multi-object auctions
Consider an auction for the reservation of seats in a particular flight. Each potential
buyer submits bids for each of the seats in the airplane, but restricts the total number of
seats he may wish to obtain. This auction has the property that the payment of agent i
for the set of seats allocated to it, subject to his quantity constraint, is the sum of his bids
for the individual seats in this set. However, this auction is a sub-additive combinatorial
auction; a buyer will pay 0 for every additional seat assigned to him beyond his limit on
the number of required seats.
Definition 1. A quantity-constrained multi-object auction is a sub-additive combinatorial
auction where bids are of the form (a1,p1, a2,p2, . . . , ak,pk, q) where pi is a price offer
for object ai , and q is the maximal number of objects that are to be assigned.
Notice that in the above definition we used the term multi-object auction. This is in order
to emphasize that although the auction is combinatorial, it has some syntactic similarity
with other types of multi-object auctions, such as constrained multi-object auctions [11],
since the bids are not stated explicitly for bundles of goods.
Theorem 1. Quantity-constrained multi-object auctions are computationally tractable.
Proof. We reduce the input of a quantity-constrained multi-object auction to an input
of a b-matching problem in a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E = V1 × V2) where V1
is isomorphic to the set of bids and V2 is isomorphic to the set of objects. An edge eij
which connects a node associated with the ith bid to a node associated with the j th object
will be assigned a cost that equals bid i’s offer for good j (the cost equals 0 if bid i
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does not refer to object j ). The pair of b values of a node vi ∈ V1 associated with a bid
(a1,p1, a2,p2, . . . , ak,pk, q) will be (0, q). The b value of vj ∈ V2 will be (0,1).
The above reduction is polynomial and creates an input of a b-matching problem. There
is a one to one and onto mapping between the b-matchings and the possible allocation
of the goods based on the agents’ bids. A b-matching where vi ∈ V1 is connected to
v12, v
2
2 , . . . , v
t
2 ∈ V2 (1  t  q) will be associated with the allocation of the objects
associated with nodes v12 , v
2
2, . . . , v
t
2 ∈ V2 to the agent who submitted the bid bi . Similarly,
given a feasible allocation of the goods, we can look at the edges associated with that
allocation to define a corresponding b-matching. Moreover, the sum of costs associated
with the given b-matching is by definition the sum of price offers for the objects as specified
by the corresponding bids. Hence, the optimal weighted b-matching of the graph defines a
solution to the quantity-constrained multi-object auction. ✷
The importance of the above result is by showing a general connection between b-
matchings and feasible allocations of the goods based on agents’ bids. In the sequel
we will consider also cases where this mapping is more subtle. For ease of exposition,
although some of the following results expand on the construction presented in the
proof of Theorem 1, we will introduce each of these results separately, emphasizing the
distinguished points of its proof.
4. Binary bids revisited
Theorem 1 shows that quantity constraints can be incorporated into simple multi-object
auctions, while still getting tractable solutions. Previous work has tried to tackle the
tractability of combinatorial auctions where bids are given for non-singleton bundles. It
was shown that the case of bundles of size two is tractable, while the case of larger bundles
is NP-hard. We now show that the case of bundles of size two and the case of quantity
constraints can be tackled simultaneously in an efficient manner.
Definition 2. A quantity-constrained multi-object action with binary combinatorial
bundles is a sub-additive combinatorial auction that allows two types of bids: (1) The bids
allowed in a quantity-constrained multi-object auctions. (2) Bids of the form (a,p, b, q, l)
where p is the price offer for good a, q is the price offer for good b, and p + q − l is the
combinatorial price offer for the pair {a, b}, where 0< l < min(p, q),
Theorem 2. Quantity-constrained multi-object auctions with binary combinatorial bundles
are computationally tractable.
Proof. We construct a graph G as in Theorem 1, and for each bid of the form x =
(a,p, b, q, l) we do the following:
(1) We add three nodes vx, vx1, vx2 .
(2) We connect vx to a, b, vx1 and vx2 .
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(3) Denote w = l/2. We assign edge weights as follows: (vx, a)→ p − w, (vx, b)→
q −w, (vx, vx1)→w, (vx, vx2)→−w.
(4) We require that vx will have the b-value (2,2) (i.e., exactly 2), and that vx1 and vx2 will
have the b-value (0,1) (i.e., at most 1).
We now prove that the optimal b-matching in the graph G corresponds to an optimal
solution of the multi-object auction with binary combinatorial bundles.
Consider the node vx associated with the bid x = (a,p, b, q, l). In a b-matching this
node should be associated with two other nodes. If both (vx, vx1) and (vx, vx2) are in the
b-matching then this situation will be associated with the situation where bid x has not
been selected, and both a and b have not been allocated based on that bid. If (vx, vx1) and
(vx, a) are in the b-matching then this situation will be associated with the situation where
only object a has been assigned based on the bid x; similarly, for the case where (vx, vx1)
and (vx, b) are in the b-matching. If both (vx, a) and (vx, b) are in the b-matching then
this situation will be associated with the situation where the pair {a, b} is allocated based
on the bid x . Notice that an optimal b-matching cannot contain vx2 but not vx1 , since l > 0.
We need now to check that the value obtained by having vx connected both to a and to b in
an optimal b-matching will be p + q − l, that the value obtained by having vx connected
only to a (respectively b) will be p (respectively q), and that the value obtained by having
vx disconnected from a and b in the b-matching (i.e., connected to both vx1 and vx2 ) will
be 0.
We consider the possible allocations with regard to the bid x = (a,p, b, q, l):
(1) If both a and b are not allocated then the cost contributed by this bid in the corre-
sponding b-matching is w−w= 0 as required.
(2) If only a is allocated then the cost contributed by this bid in the corresponding
b-matching is p−w+w = p as required.
(3) If only b is allocated then the cost contributed by this bid in the corresponding
b-matching is q −w+w = q as required.
(4) If both a and b are allocated then the cost contributed by this bid in the correspon-
ding b-matching is q −w+ p−w = p+ q − l as required.
Notice that in order for the above to hold we must have that p−w >w and q−w >w.
since otherwise (vx, vx1) might be selected by the optimal b-matching instead of either
(vx, a) or (vx, b) when the optimal assignment of the goods is to have both a and b based
on bid x . This is guaranteed by the condition l < min(p, q). ✷
4.1. Intuitive discussion of our proof technique
The reader may find the following discussion of our proof technique useful. One way to
represent a simple bidding activity, is by using a bi-partite graph. One part of the nodes in
this graph is associated with the bids’ names, and the other part of the nodes is associated
with the objects’ names. If the bids were only for single objects, or if bids were fully
additive (e.g., it cannot be the case that an agent’s bid for a pair of goods (g1, g2) is different
from the sum of its bids for g1 and g2) then we can associate edges in the graph with bids
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for the goods, where the weight of the edge connecting a bid b to an object (good) g is the
the value of the corresponding bid. Finding (standard) optimal weighted matching will be
satisfactory in this case. However, in combinatorial auctions the bids are not fully additive.
Our way to overcome this is by adding few additional nodes to be connected to the node
denoting a particular bid (here a bid corresponds to a price offer for a bundle, e.g., a pair of
goods, and price offers for all its subsets). The value of the edges are selected in a way that
they will compensate for the deviation from the fully additive case. If the agent submits
a bid for a pair of goods, and the singletons it consists of, then two additional nodes will
be added, and the b-value of the original bid’s node will be taken to be 2. Notice now
that when selecting two nodes which are adjacent to the original bid’s node, a (possibly
empty) subset of the objects associated with the bid will be selected. The weights of the
corresponding edges are calculated in a way that when two adjacent nodes to the original
bid’s node are selected (as required by the b-matching), then the sum of the corresponding
edge values (i.e., the values of the edges connecting the selected nodes to the original bid’s
node) will be identical to the value of the bid on the corresponding objects (which may be
a pair of goods, only a single good, or none of the goods).
As the reader may notice, the above idea is quite general and can be applied to relatively
complicated non-additive cases. In the next sections we will show how it applies to other
non-additive (combinatorial) auctions.
4.2. Remark: Multi-unit binary combinatorial auctions
An interesting generalization of combinatorial auctions with binary bids has to do with
the case where there are several available units of each of the goods. In this case, when the
agent makes a bid for the bundle {a, b}, it does not care which copies of the objects a and
b it will obtain, as long as it will obtain a copy of each one of them. The related problem
is termed the multi-unit CAP (muCAP). Using the idea of b-matching it is easy to show
that multi-unit binary combinatorial auctions are tractable. All that is needed is to treat the
goods as nodes in a graph, bids as corresponding edges and edge weights, and have the
b-value of each node to be the number of units available from the corresponding good. The
fact the corresponding muCAP is tractable easily follows.
5. Beyond binary bids
As we mentioned, combinatorial auctions where bids are only for single goods or for
pairs of goods are tractable [13]. However, when bids are for bundles of size greater than
two, the CAP is in general intractable. Notice that in Theorem 1 we presented general
tractable non-binary combinatorial auctions where the bids for singletons can not be simply
sum up in order to get the bid for a bundle of goods. However, this was a result of a
constraint on the number of goods to be allocated; when this constraint is satisfied, the
bid/payment for an allocated set of goods equals the sum of bids for the objects it consists
of. In this section we wish to relax this property; namely, we wish to consider cases where
the bid for an allocated set of goods is different from the sum of bids for the singletons
it consists of. Our aim is to do so for auctions where bids are for bundles of size greater
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than two. We now present two results that we believe to be of considerable importance
in this regard. The first result shows that we can handle bundles of size larger than two
in which the bid for an allocated set of goods is different from the sum of bids for the
singletons it consists of. Then we show that a general form of combinatorial auctions where
bids for triplets are permitted, i.e., combinatorial auctions with symmetric bids for triplets,
is tractable. These results, and the exact assumption required for establishing them, are
presented in the following subsections. The intuition of the proof techniques is similar to
the one presented in the previous section, although the technical details in some cases are
slightly more involved.
5.1. Almost additive auctions
Definition 3. An almost-additive multi-object auction is a combinatorial sub-additive
auction where bids for non-singletons are of the form (a1,p1, a2,p2, . . . , ak,pk, q) where
pi is the price offer for object ai , the price offer for any A⊂ {a1, . . . , ak} equals∑ai∈A pi ,
and the offer for {a1, . . . , ak} is q ; in addition, w =∑1ik pi − q > 0, and w < pj
(1 j  k).
In an almost-additive multi-object auction a shopping list of items is gradually built
until we reach a situation that the valuations become sub-additive; sub-additivity is a result
of the requirement that w > 0. The other condition on w implies that the bid on the whole
bundle is not too low with respect to the sum of bids on the single goods it consists of.
Notice that typically q will be greater than the sum of any proper subset of the pi ’s; our
only requirement is that q will be lower than the sum of all the pi ’s; hence, bidding on and
allocation of the whole {a1, a2, . . . , ak} bundle is a feasible and reasonable option.
Theorem 3. Almost-additive multi-object auctions are computationally tractable.
Proof. We start from the graph G that was built for the quantity-constrained multi-object
auction, and add the following for each almost additive bid (a1,p1, a2,p2, . . . , ak,pk, q):
(1) Construct k + 1 new nodes: v, v1, v2, . . . , vk , and connect v to each of the vj ’s. In
addition, we connect v to each object aj (1 j  k).
(2) Let w = (∑1ik pi)− q , and let a = k−1k w.
(3) The weights of the newly added edges will be as follows:
(a) (v, v1)→ a,
(b) (v,vj )→ −ak−1 (1 < j  k),(c) (v, aj )→ pj − ak−1 , for (1 j  k).
(4) The b-value of v is taken to be exactly k (i.e., (k, k)). The b-values of the vj ’s are taken
as (0,1) (i.e., at most 1).
Consider now the optimal weighted b-matching in the corresponding graph. It follows
that if none of the aj ’s are allocated then the sum of costs contributed to the corresponding
matching is 0, as required.
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If a strict non-empty subset al1, . . . , als (1 s < k) of the aj ’s is allocated then the sum
of costs contributed to the corresponding matching is( ∑
1is
pli
)
− s a
k − 1 + a −
a
k − 1 (k − s − 1)=
∑
1is
pli ,
as required.
If all the aj are allocated then the sum of costs contributed to the corresponding
matching is∑
1jk
pk − k a
k − 1 =
∑
1jk
pk −w = q,
as required.
Notice that we need to have a < pj − ak−1 for every j in order to obtain the desired
reduction. If this is not satisfied then the b-matching algorithm may select (v, v1) instead
of one of the (v, aj )’s, and the value obtained will be different from the price offer for
the bundle. Hence, we need to have k
k−1a < pj , i.e., we need to have that w < pj , which
is exactly our requirement. As a result, by finding an optimal weighted b-matching in the
corresponding graph, we get a solution to the corresponding CAP. ✷
5.2. The case of triples
The case of combinatorial auctions with bids for triples of goods, rather than only for
pairs of goods, is NP-hard. However, consider the following:
Definition 4. A combinatorial auction with sub-additive symmetric bids for triplets is a
sub-additive combinatorial auction where bids are either for singletons, for pairs of goods
(and the singletons they are built of), or for triplets of goods (and the corresponding
subsets). Bids for pairs of goods are as in Definition 2, while bids for triplets have the
form (a1,p1, a2,p2, a3,p3, b1, b2): pi is the price offer for good ai , the price offer for any
pair of goods {ai, aj } (1 i, j  3; i 	= j) is pi+pj −b1, and the price offer for the whole
triplet {a1, a2, a3} is p1 + p2 + p3 − b2.
Symmetric bids may be applicable to many domains. One motivation is the case where
each agent has certain fixed cost associated with any purchase (e.g., paper work expenses,
etc.), which is independent of the actual product purchased; this additional cost per product
will decrease as a function of the number of products purchased (e.g., one does not need to
duplicate the amount of paper work done when purchasing a pair of products rather than
only one).
Theorem 4. Combinatorial auctions with sub-additive symmetric bids for triplets, where
each bid for triplet (a1,p1, a2,p2, a3,p3, b1, b2) has the property that b2 > 3b1, and
pi > b2 − b1 (1 i  3), are tractable.
The theorem makes use of two conditions that connect b1, b2, and the bids on singletons.
These conditions measure the amount of sub-additivity relative to the purely additive case
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where a bid for a bundle is the sum of bids for the singletons it consists of. The first
condition is that the decrease in valuation/bid for a bundle, relative to the sum of bids for
the singletons it consists of, will be proportional to the bundle’s size; the second condition
connects that decrease to the bids on the singletons, and requires that the above-mentioned
decrease will be relatively low compared to the bids on the single goods. Both of these
conditions seem quite plausible for many sub-additive auctions.
Proof. We will use the graph G constructed in Theorem 2 for quantity-constrained
multi-object auctions with binary combinatorial bundles, and for any bid on a triplet,
(a1,p1, a2,p2, a3,p3, b1, b2), we will add the following:
(1) Construct 4 new nodes: v0, v1, v2, v3, and connect v0 to v1, v2 and v3.
(2) Let k = b2−3b12b2−3b1 , and let a =
b1
1−2k .
(3) Assign weights to the new edges as follows:
(a) (v0, aj )→ pj − a + ka for 1 j  3.
(b) (v0, v1)→ a.
(c) (v0, v2)→−ka.
(d) (v0, v3)→−(1− k)a.
(4) Take the b-value of v0 to be exactly 3, and of v1, v2, v3 to be at most 1 (i.e., (0,1)).
We now compute an optimal weighted b-matching on the generated graph, and claim
it defines an optimal allocation of the goods. The proof makes use of the following
observations:
(1) If none of the aj in the triplet are allocated then the cost contributed to the
corresponding matching is a − ka − (1− k)a = 0, as required.
(2) If only one item ai is allocated, then the cost contributed to the corresponding matching
is pi − a + ka + a − ka = pi , as required.
(3) If ai and aj , i 	= j , are allocated, then the cost contributed to the corresponding
matching is pi + pj − a + 2ka = pi + pj − b1, as required.
(4) If the whole triplet is allocated then the cost contributed to the corresponding matching
is p1 + p2 + p3 − 3a + 3ka = p1 + p2 + p3 − 3a(1− k), which can be shown to be
equal to p1 + p2 + p3 − b2, as required.
Notice that we must require that pj − a + ka > a for every j ; otherwise, the optimal
b-matching will select (v0, v1) instead of one of the edges connecting v0 to the nodes
associated with the goods, when the optimal allocation selects the bid that corresponds to
the whole triplet. Hence, we need to require that pj > 2a − ka = (2− k)a. But,
2− k = 2− b2 − 3b1
2b2 − 3b1 =
3b2 − 3b1
2b2 − 3b1 .
On the other hand,
1− 2k = 1− 2b2 − 6b1
2b2 − 3b1 =
3b1
2b2 − 3b1 ,
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which implies that 11−2k = 2b2−3b13b1 . Therefore
(2− k)a = 3b2 − 3b1
2b2 − 3b1 b1
2b2 − 3b1
3b1
= b2 − b1.
Since we have required pj > b2 − b1 we get the desired result. ✷
6. A tractable super-additive combinatorial auction
In the previous sections we have presented solutions for some non-trivial sub-additive
combinatorial auctions. In this section we show an instance of super-additive combinatorial
auctions that can be solved by similar techniques.
Definition 5. A combinatorial auction with super-additive symmetric bids for triplets is a
super-additive combinatorial auction where each agent submits a bid for a triplet of goods
and its corresponding subsets, and is guaranteed to obtain at least one good. The bids for
triplets have the form (a1,p1, a2,p2, a3,p3, b1, b2): pi is the price offer for good ai , the
price offer for any pair of goods {ai, aj } (1 i, j  3; i 	= j) is pi+pj +b1, and the price
offer for the whole triplet {a1, a2, a3} is p1 +p2 +p3 + b2. We assume 1.5b1  b2  2b1.
Notice that the major additional restriction we have here is that the auction procedure
must allocate at least a single good to each agent. This restriction is in the spirit of
constrained multi-object auctions (see [11] for results and discussion of these basic
auctions): many auctions’ settings are not concerned only with revenue maximization,
but should obey additional constraints (this is for example the case in the famous FCC
auctions), and constraints on the allocations are considered. One of the most simple such
constraints is restricting the allocation of goods to an agent to include at most/at least a
particular number of particular elements. For example, when allocating communication
lines a user may be guaranteed to obtain one of the several communications lines that are
needed for its operation. In such cases, a reserve price restricting the the value of bids may
be useful (this modification will not change our result).
Theorem 5. Combinatorial auctions with super-additive symmetric bids for triplets are
computationally tractable.
Proof. We build a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2,E), where V1 is isomorphic to the set
of agents and V2 is isomorphic to the set of goods. The set of edges E will be defined as
follows. For each vi ∈ Vi , associated with the bid (a1,p1, a2,p2, a3,p3, b1, b2) of agent i ,
we add the following:
(1) We add two additional nodes, vi1 , and vi2 .
(2) Let a = 23b2 − b1, and let b = b1 − 13b2. Notice that both a and b are positive, since
1.5b1  b2  2b1. We build the following edges and corresponding weights:
(a) (vi, a1)→ p1 + a + b.
(b) (vi , a2)→ p2 + a + b.
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(c) (vi, a3)→ p3 + a + b.
(d) (vi , vi1)→−a.
(e) (vi, vi2)→−b.
(3) The b-value of vi is exactly 3, the v-values of the aj ’s and the vik ’s are at most 1 (i.e.,
(0,1)).
We now compute an optimal weighted b-matching, which gives us the desired result.
This stems from the following observations on the allocations determined by the b-
matching with regard to the bid (a1,p1, a2,p2, a3,p3, b1, b2) by an agent j :
(1) If only item ai is allocated then the corresponding weight in the b-matching will be
pi + a + b− a − b = pi , as required.
(2) If two items, ai and aj , are allocated, then the corresponding weight in the b-matching
will be pi + pj + 2a + 2b− a = pi + pj + a + 2b= pi + pj + b1, as required.
(3) If all three items are allocated then the corresponding weight in the b-matching will be
p1 + p2 + p3 + 3a + 3b= p1 +p2 + p3 + b2, as required.
Notice that in order that the above will hold we need to require that −a −b, or a  b,
which is satisfied since b1  b2/2. ✷
7. Combinatorial network auctions
Auctions for linear goods are a useful case of tractable combinatorial auctions (see [9,
13]). In an auction for linear goods we have an ordered list of m goods, g1, . . . , gm, and
bids should refer to bundles of the form gi, gi+1, gi+2, . . . , gj−1, gj where j  i , i.e., there
are no “holes” in the bundle. Auctions for linear goods can be used for time scheduling
(e.g., for the allocation of time slots in a conference room), or for the allocation of one-
dimensional space (e.g., for parts of a seashore), etc. In this section we widely extend the
result on the tractability of auctions for linear goods, by considering combinatorial network
auctions:
Definition 6. Let O = {g1, . . . , gm} be a set of goods. A network of goods is a tree
G(O)= (V (O),E(O)), where the set of nodes, V (O), is isomorphic to the set of goods
O . A combinatorial network auction with respect to the set of goods O and the network
G(O), is a combinatorial auction where bids can be submitted only for bundles associated
with paths in G(O).
It is clear that combinatorial auctions for linear goods are simple instances of
combinatorial network auctions, where the network is a simple path. Using, yet again,
matching techniques we can now show:
Theorem 6. Combinatorial network auctions are computationally tractable.
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Proof. Consider the graph G(O). We construct the (weighted) graph Gnet which is built
from G(O) by adding the following nodes, edges, and edge weights:
(1) Each edge of G(O) will be assigned the weight 0.
(2) For each bid b that refers to a path from v1 to v2, we add a new node vb , and two
edges: one that connects vb to v1 and has the weight 0, and one that connects v2 to vb
and has a weight that equals the price offer in b.
(3) For each v ∈ V (O) we add a simple loop that connects v directly to itself, and has
the weight 0. Similarly, for every node vb , associated with bid b, we add an edge with
weight 0 connecting it to itself.
The optimal allocation is given by computing an optimal weighted coverage of Gnet by
circles. In other words, we look for a subset of the edges, such that in the induced sub-graph
with the same nodes and the corresponding edges, both the in-degree and the out-degree of
each node is exactly 1; we search for such a set of maximal weight.
There is an isomorphism between the coverings of Gnet by circles and the feasible
selection of bids to determine the allocation of goods. If we consider a coverage of the
graph by circles, and remove from them the ones added in step 3, we get a well defined
set of bids that define a feasible allocation of the goods; similarly, if we consider a subset
of the bids that define a feasible allocation then it defines a proper coverage of the graph
by circles (after adding the additional self-loops for goods that have not been assigned
and bids that have not been selected). Hence, we get that the CAP problem in this case is
isomorphic to the problem of optimal coverage by circles.
The problem of optimal coverage by circles in a directed graph, with self-loops on any
node is known to be solved by the computation of optimal (weighted) perfect matching in
an undirected bi-partite graph.2
Given that the problem of finding an optimal (weighted) perfect matching is a bi-partite
graph is polynomial we get the desired result. ✷
The reader may wish to notice that the proof of the above result did not use the
whole power of b-matching. Rather, we have reduced the problem to a standard matching
technique. This is different from some of our previous results where the whole power of
b-matching techniques has been applied.
8. Conclusion
The study of auctions has received much attention in the recent AI literature. Auctions
are a basic building block of protocols for non-cooperative environments, and as a result
are central to the theory of mechanism design in economics. Most of the related literature is
concerned with game-theoretic aspects of auctions. However, when facing combinatorial
2 Although this reduction does not appear as a theorem in classical combinatorial optimization texts, it is a
well-known exercise. This is obtained by splitting any node vi into two node v
f
i
and vt
i
, and connecting vf
i
to vt
j
if and only if there is an edge leading from vi to vj .
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auctions, deep computational problems arise. Combinatorial auctions are essential when
dealing with substitute or complementary goods. Several interesting heuristics for dealing
with the combinatorial auctions problem have been presented, but the literature on analytic
approaches to dealing with this problem is very limited. In particular, the only general
combinatorial optimization technique suggested so far for dealing with this problem was
the straightforward one: since the CAP is an integer programming problem, one can look
at the LP relaxation of the problem, and study the cases where this relaxation yields integer
solutions. In this paper we discuss another powerful combinatorial optimization technique
for dealing with combinatorial auctions: b-matchings. The use of b-matching in this context
is not immediate, and requires non-trivial reductions. In this paper we have introduced
several such reductions, dealing with non-trivial instances of the combinatorial auctions
problem. We believe that the b-matching techniques exposed in this paper, can be further
used and applied to various types of combinatorial auctions, and can play an important role
in addressing the complexity of these basic mechanisms.
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